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March 20091. Introduction
“I do not know”, Alexis de Tocqueville says in Democracy in America, “if
one can cite a single manufacturing and commercial nation – from the
Tyrants to the Florentine and the English, – that has not also been free.
Therefore a close tie and a necessary relation exists between those two
things: freedom and industry.” Tocqueville expresses what could be called
a development truism of half a thousand years from late Renaissance city-
states to Marshall Plan and Havana Charter. Indeed, during the
Enlightenment, civilization and democracy were understood, through the
analysis of people like Montesquieu and Voltaire among many others, as
products of a specific type of economic structure. When German economist
Johan Jacob Meyen stated in 1770 that “it is known that a primitive peo-
ple does not improve their customs and institutions later to find useful
industries, but the other way around”, he expressed something which could
be considered common sense at the time. We find the same idea – that civ-
ilization is created by industrialization or, to put it more specifically, by the
presence of increasing returns activities – in the 19th century in thinkers
across the whole political spectrum from Abraham Lincoln to Karl Marx.
Industrialization “draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civiliza-
tion” as Marx puts it. What might be called the historical development con-
sensus saw, in other words, the aim of development in the creation of mid-
dle-income economies – with all the accompanying values and culture that
in turn were perceived as highly conducive to further sustained develop-
ment. However, as Figures 1 and 2 show, the creation of middle-income
economies has become a true rarity in the last three decades. 
2Figure1. GDP per person employed, index (1980 = 100), 1980-2006.
Source: World Bank WDI online database.
Apart from East Asia’s much praised experience and the enormous catch-
ing-up taking place in China and, to a lesser degree, in India, the rest of the
developing world from Eastern Europe to Latin America and Africa is expe-
riencing strong cognitive dissonance. 
Figure 2. GDP per capita in selected developing countries, 1950-2001 (in 1990 inter-
national Geary-Khamis dollars)
Source: Original data extracted from Maddisson 2003.
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1 We would like to thank Yves Ekoué Amaïzo for his help with the data used in Figures 2 and 3. While many of these countries have seen significant growth in exports and
in foreign capital inflows, their income levels have flatlined since 1980 and
in most cases actually dropped in the 1990s. (Figure 1)
In fact, compared to highly developed countries, most developing countries
were on a steady track towards catching up until the early 1980s; the sub-
sequent decades show continuous and significant catching up – and actu-
al surging ahead in the case of some countries such as Singapore – of East
Asian economies. (Figure 2; see also Wade 2008) The trends follow rather
precisely the changes in development thinking from classical development
economics up to the late 1970s to the Washington Consensus from the
1980s.
Figure 3. Growth rate of GDP per capita of selected world regions; regional average in
selected periods between 1820 and 2001; annual average compound growth rate.
Source: Original data extracted from Maddisson 2003.
Moreover, as Figure 3 shows, in recent decades, most developing regions
– again with the exception of East Asia – experienced growth rates that go
clearly against the more or less positive trend of the last 200 years from a
long-term historical perspective. In other words, the world after the indus-
trial revolution has not seen such a dismal development performance. The
Washington Consensus in development mainstream seems to be a failure
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While Amsden argues, in contrast, that during these same decades, for
most developing countries, “Heaven slowly gave way to Hell” (2007, 2),
even the most ardent supporters of the Washington Consensus are forced
to admit that there is something similar to the ‘China price’ in the develop-
ment statistics of the poorer countries from 1980 onwards. If one deducts
China’s and India’s growth from the developing countries’ data, there is not
much as far as growth and development in the rest of the developing world
is concerned. And neither China nor India can be counted as showcases of
the neo-liberal policies propagated by the Washington Consensus. We will
return to this later.
As the World Bank itself admits, the rest of the developing countries,
notably in Africa, Latin America and some of the former Soviet republics (in
Central Asia, Moldova, Ukraine) suffer from heavy doses of a cognitive dis-
sonance between promised growth and the reality of standing still, if they
are lucky, or dropping backwards to income levels of earlier decades:
“Whereas Latin America’s income per head grew by 10 percent in the entire
25 years from 1980 to 2005, it grew by 82 percent in the 20 years from
1960 to 1980.” (Amsden 2007, 6; also World Bank 2006; see also Chang
2007) 
Latin America diligently followed policy reform suggestions yet failed to
grow, as the World Bank also admits (World Bank 2006, 36-29); Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union were equally willing to apply the poli-
cy reforms, and again, according to the World Bank’s calculations, the
recession these countries saw in the 1990s and many are still experiencing
is worse than the Great Depression in the USA and World War II in Western
Europe (in both cases, countries affected recovered considerably quicker).
In fact, for example, “even if Ukraine managed to grow steadily at 5 per-
cent a year, starting in 2002, it would take until 2017 to regain its previ-
ous peak – implying a transformational recession of more than a quarter of
a century at best.” (World Bank 2006, 33) Indeed, also for most Eastern
European countries the recession was severe and lasted at least 10 years.
(Reinert and Kattel 2007, Tiits et al 2008)
Coupled with the change of techno-economic paradigm that completely
changed the nature of industrialization (outsourcing) and essentially stripped
many maturing and increasingly footloose industrial activities of significant
(dynamic) scale economies, Washington Consensus policies emphasising
5
2 To be precise, Rodrik and Skidelsky, similarly to many others, mean mostly poverty reduction
in this context. FDI-led growth have created a truly toxic situation for many developing
countries where initially the liability destruction was strong and quick but
followed by slow asset creation. Thus, “the failure of the Consensus reform
policies lies in the fact that they provided support for the ‘destruction’ of
inefficient domestic industry, but failed to provide support for the ‘creative’
phase of ‘creative destruction’ of a real transformation of the productive
structure through higher investment and technological innovation.” (Kregel
2008) We will return to this topic as well. However, it seems rather obvi-
ous that the development community has unlearned how to create middle-
income countries.
Yet, there is growing concern and evidence that the current form of glob-
alization not only hurts developing countries that have followed the
Washington Consensus policies, but is also harmful to the developed North.
The flipside of the unlearning that has taken place in the development com-
munity seems to be that we are unlearning how to create middle-class jobs
in the developed core countries. For all intents and purposes, non-existing
growth in real wage in USA and Germany over the last decade has given
ample reasons to start considering the impact of Washington Consensus
trade policies on these countries, the most prominent examples being
Samuelson’s (2004) and Krugman’s (2008) accounts. In 2004, Samuelson
argued that continuing globalization and economic integration of world mar-
kets in its present form will do permanent harm to high-wage jobs in high-
ly developed countries like the US. In early 2008, Krugman, another celebri-
ty mainstream economist, argued that increased trade between US and
developing countries is factually hurting US wages and middle-class jobs
and thus increases income inequality. He goes on to prove this not only
with US data but also with elaborate modeling.
What Krugman does not realize, or at any rate he does not say it explicitly,
is that the problem lies not in the structure or policies of the US economy
or even in the growing trade as such but in the nature of specialization of
developing country exports. Specializing in lower-end production or servic-
es (also in sectors like ICT) virtually traps developing countries into low-
wage jobs and, at the same time, lures the high-wage middle-class jobs
away from the developed nations. Thus, while the global production grows,
not all countries necessarily benefit from it. And, consequently, “firms max-
imize global output but do not necessarily maximize national income.”
(Palley 2006, 16)
In this introductory essay, we aim to show, first, how the classical devel-
opment economics, that of Ragnar Nurkse’s (1907-1957) generation, epit-
omized the best development practices of the past 500 years and crafted
them into what Krugman rightly calls high development theory (1994). It is
6not a coincidence that the post-World-War-II era, when Nurkse and others
ruled the development mainstream, is one of exceptionally good perform-
ance for many poor countries. Second, we argue that the alleged death of
the classical development economics and subsequent rise of the
Washington Consensus has to do not so much with increasing modeling in
economics, a way of research purposely discarded by many classical devel-
opment thinkers (as Krugman 1994 claims), but much more with misun-
derstanding the reasons for East Asia’s success and Latin America’s
demise; we show that the root cause of this misunderstanding – that goes
in fact back to ‘misreading’ key passages in Adam Smith – is the role of
technology, or of increasing returns activities, and of finance, in develop-
ment. Third, we aim to indicate key areas of further research that the cur-
rent development mainstream should pursue in order to re-learn how to cre-
ate middle-income economies and middle-class jobs.
2. Classical Development Economics
Pre-Smithian economics saw development as a goal created by increasing
returns and innovations in manufacturing and not in agriculture, where stag-
nant productivity, diminishing returns and monoculture as well as the
absence of synergies prevented growth.
3 Furthermore, the targeting, sup-
port and protection of manufacturing – that is of increasing returns activi-
ties – were argued in terms of, first, its ability to create wealth; second, its
ability to create employment; third, its ability to solve balance of payment
problems; and fourth, its ability to increase the velocity of circulation of
money. The connection between increasing activities and the creation of
more or less stable and sustainable states with more or less liberal values
can be seen as key throughout this entire tradition that reaches until the
Marshall plan. Indeed, from as early as Giovanni Botero (1588) and the
Staatsraison (“reason of state”) tradition, there are clear links between eco-
nomic structure and the viability of states. This tradition was continued by
18
th-century social scientists and by Friedrich List, directly linking manufac-
turing and ‘civilization’. In fact, already in early German social science, Veit
Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626-1692) found that Germany did not have the
economic basis to create a society like the one observed and so admired in
the Dutch Republic. Seckendorff’s approach to making the state function
better was intimately tied to changing the economic basis of the state itself,
its mix of professions and industries and their geographical relocation with-
in the realm. In the tradition started by Seckendorff, the Fürsten (Princes)
were turned into modernizers by arguing that their Recht (right) to govern
7
3 The following paragraphs draw on Reinert 2007.was accompanied by a Pflicht (duty) to modernize and, in effect, in the long
term create the conditions where the Fürsten in the end would be obsolete
and the conditions needed for a functioning democracy would have been
created. A successful Principality carried with it the seeds of its own
destruction and the birth of democracy. 
The first wealthy states with some kind of republican rule were often
islands like Venice and the Dutch Republic. The absence of arable land both
led to an absence of a feudal structure and contributed to the creation of a
diversified economic structure including activities subject to increasing
returns. This makes Florence, with power also by landowners, so interest-
ing. There the corporazioni (guilds) and the burgers fought for power among
themselves, but very early (12
th-13
th century) they had banned the families
that owned the land around from participating in politics (these continued
to trouble Florence for centuries through alliances with other cities). 
There is, then, a long history of trying to move the vested interests of the
ruling class from land to manufacturing. The rulers who had a manufactur-
ing strategy also tended to have a policy against the land-owning nobility,
starting with Henry VII in England in 1485. 
In sum, there are a number of basic principles of development that can be
observed in action from 15
th-century Tudor England to the Marshall Plan.
Despite all the theoretical and historical diversity that makes up this tradi-
tion of more than 500 years, one very simple formula sums it up rather
effectively: a nation is better off with an inefficient industrial (increasing
returns) sector than with none at all. Yet, part of this consensus is also the
understanding that possessing an industrial sector, however inefficient,
should be followed by increased trade in order to create competitive pres-
sure for the industrial sector.
Classical development economics, while in itself a highly diverse group of
economists and economic as well as policy ideas, is till today perhaps the
best-articulated and theoretically grounded expression of the above-
described development consensus. And, as Krugman argues, the “irony is
that we can now see that high development theory made perfectly good
sense after all.” (1994)
The group of economists commonly referred to as classical development
economics or pioneers of development, or high development theory, is typ-
ically seen to consists of 4-6 key thinkers: Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Hans
Singer, Arthur Lewis, Albert Hirschman, Gunnar Myrdal and Ragnar
8Nurkse.
4 While of this group, Nurkse’s contribution is the strongest in terms
of economic theory, Hirschman’s accomplishments are perhaps the far-
thest-reaching in terms of influencing social science and development main-
stream the most. Up to this day, it is relatively typical to find accounts that
juxtapose precisely these two thinkers as representing almost exactly
opposing ideas about development, namely balanced vs. unbalanced
growth. However, as Hirschman later acknowledges, the differences
between him and Nurkse were minor at the end of the day, and in large
parts, they shared a very similar outlook. (Hirschman 1984; see also Nurkse
1961, 241ff)
In what follows, we base our brief account mostly on Nurkse’s ideas
accompanying them with bits and pieces from the other pioneers, mostly
from Rosenstein-Rodan and Hirschman.
5
The high development theory developed by Nurkse and others rests on two
key ideas:
First, financing for development has to come to a large extent from the
developing country itself (“Capital is made at home”; Nurkse 1961, 141),
6
and
Second, the key areas to be financed need to exhibit increasing returns in
order to trigger dynamics of development or, as Myrdal argued, virtuous cir-
cles of growth.
7
What makes Nurkse’s contribution so important is the fact that he is the
only thinker from this group to, first, incorporate both key ideas into a
coherent theory of development and, second, to draw clear relationships
between these notions.
8 Indeed, this is precisely the reason Nurkse favored
the balanced growth approach over the unbalanced one (the difference,
9
4 There are a number of other thinkers that played key roles in early development theory who
could be mentioned here as well, for instance Raul Prebish, W.W. Rostow and others. A good
collection of recollections by the key figures in this tradition is gathered in Meier and Seers
1984 (although this does not include Nurkse as he had passed away by the time of this publi-
cation).
5 We are necessarily generalizing, for more detailed accounts we refer the reader to subsequent
contributions in this volume.
6 While Nurkse 1961 is a collection of his various works, we refer to this publication as a
whole.
7 For Nurkse, key passages are Nurkse 1953, 19-25.
8 Krugman 1994, for instances, discusses only the aspect of increasing returns and fails to note
how this is related to financial issues.simply put, being between whether one industrializes in numerous or just
few key areas): the former was deemed by Nurkse to be financially more
stable than the latter. (1961, 241ff) 
According to Nurkse, the financing for development has to come mainly
from within the country set on development because financing of growth
through either foreign investments or increased trade was largely a histori-
cally unique phenomenon confined to the 19
th century and more specifical-
ly to American experience. (See, e.g., Nurkse 1961, 134-136; 282-286)
The ‘new countries’ within and without the British Empire were “high
income countries from the start: effective markets as well as efficient pro-
ducers.” (1961, 243) Nurkse thought that it would be nearly impossible for
any developing country to repeat such a successful trade- and foreign-
financing based growth strategy because America was highly rich in
resources but at the same time populated by workforce essentially on the
same skill level as Britain. (1961, 143) This unique combination made the
American experience non-replicable because in any other circumstance,
trade and foreign investment would engender a number of obstacles to
development. Namely, first, large parts of such financing would seek to uti-
lize poor countries resources and eventually lock these countries into undi-
versified economies with a skewed social structure; (Nurkse 1961, 100,
137, 144, 248) and second, there is clear danger that significant amounts
of foreign financing would end up funding private consumption patterns
emulating Western living standards and thus creating balance of payments
problems (Nurkse 1953, 66-70). 
To sum it up, a growth strategy simply based on trade and foreign financ-
ing would leave the poor countries with negative financial flows and undi-
versified production structure – just like the Washington Consensus, as we
will show below –, and this amounts to financial fragility or to a Ponzi
financing position. The problem with such a strategy is that it relies on for-
eign financing to balance the current account, and this can take place only
under very specific conditions: “it is only possible to maintain a develop-
ment strategy based on net imports financed by foreign capital inflows if
the interest rates on the foreign borrowing are equal to the rate of increase
of foreign borrowing. If interest rates are higher than the rate of increase of
inflows … the policy will eventually and automatically become self-revers-
ing as the current account becomes dominated by interest and profit remit-
tances that exceed capital inflows.” (Kregel 2004, 11) This, arguably, is
what has made various growth efforts in developing countries so difficult
to sustain in the last few development decades: many growth strategies are
simply based on self-reversing logic, and this is indeed what Nurkse clearly
foresaw.
10Thus, according to Nurkse, any economic strategy that wants to be sus-
tainable in the long term has to come up with another way of financing the
development. What this, however, means is that such a development strat-
egy has to work in a relatively confined environment in terms of capital and
skills. Taking into account the financial constraints described above, it is in
this context that Nurkse interprets Adam Smith’s famous theorem about
the size of the market being limited by the division of labor. For Nurkse, fol-
lowing Allyn Young’s 1928 essay, this theorem indicates that the size of
the market is limited by real wages that are, in turn, limited by productivity
growth. (1953, 21-25) For Nurkse, and very clearly for Hirschman and
Rosenstein-Rodan, productivity growth is determined by the presence of
increasing returns in an economy. (Nurkse 1953, 8, 14; also Nurkse 1961,
5-9, 27-29, 32; Rosenstein-Rodan 1984) Thus, a viable development strat-
egy should aim at establishing a number of increasing returns activities that
would become each other’s customers and generate the first virtuous cir-
cle of growth. The size of the market is limited by the number of increas-
ing returns activities present at the particular market. This dynamics is the
essence of Nurkse’s balanced growth, but also of Rosenstein-Rodan’s big
push and, in the end, also of Hirschman’s unbalanced growth, expressed in
very similar wording. 
The expansion of the market can be realized only through a process of balanced
growth, where people in different industries, working with more and better
tools, become each other’s customers. (Nurkse archives, Box 8; see also
Nurkse 1961, 252); 
… new producers will be each other’s customers, and the complementarity of
demand will reduce the risk of not finding a market. Risk reduction is in this
sense a special case of external economies. (1984, 213)
Hirschman argues that such an interrelatedness – which he called backward
and forward linkages – does not happen simultaneously but rather in a
sequential process of learning and development and that in this process, the
role of public policy or development strategy in setting goals and advancing
specific sectors is key.
9 Nurkse’s most serious argument against this is that
such unbalanced growth will very probably need to rely on foreign financ-
ing at some point, as also Hirschman admits (1984, 103). As we have
argued above, due to the specific nature of such foreign financing (extrac-
tive in its nature and easily engendering lock-in effects, plus financing the
consumption of imported goods), Nurkse was wary that such a strategy
would lead to financial fragility. (1961, 247-253) As we have argued
above, this proved to be a highly far-sighted concern.
11
9  Hirschman discusses his relationship to Nurkse and Rosenstein-Rodan most explicitly in
Hirschman 1984, see especially 96-97.It is important to note that most subsequent accounts of big push and bal-
anced growth theories only emphasize the idea of consorted investments,
mostly missing the point that, first, these policy efforts should target
increasing returns activities and that, second, the reasoning behind this has
to do with financial stability (see, e.g., Easterly 2008). 
In order to create increasing returns activities, infant industry protection may
be necessary according to Nurkse and others, but it is also more important
here to realize that the argument is less about protection but about what is
specifically targeted with the protective policies and how: infant creation is
more important than infant protection. (Nurkse 1961, 247, 257; 1953, 104-
105, 109) Indeed, perhaps the key idea behind targeting increasing returns
activities is that the resulting virtuous circles of growth (productivity and
wage growth) act as barriers of entry for competitors both in terms of pri-
vate companies but also in terms of regions and countries. (See also Reinert
1980, Gomory and Baumol 2004) The reason is evident in the very logic of
balance growth: virtuous circles of growth relay and create their own
demand and financing. (Nurkse 1961, 296) Thus, the driving idea behind
Nurkse’s balanced growth is not simply a set of reasons and/or policies for
the creation of diversity in increasing returns activities, but moreover to
show that both as a theoretical foundation and as a policy strategy, bal-
anced growth is coherent and sustainable as it shows how long-term growth
with financial stability can be achieved and maintained. In sum, Nurkse’s
balanced growth shows how middle-income nations can be created.
The quest to create middle-income economies as the main goal of develop-
ment can also be stated differently: how to upgrade developing countries’
economic structures with raising wages and without beggar-thy-neighbor
type of policies for instance in foreign exchange rates, labor markets, tax
rates, and so forth. (See also Summers 2008) This, however, is largely the
way competitiveness has come to be defined by international organizations
like OECD and the European Union. Interestingly, however, this definition of
competitiveness comes from a 1985 Reagan administration report Global
Competition: The New Reality by the President’s Commission on Industrial
Competitiveness (see Scott and Lodge 1985 as background). Historically,
however, this goes back further to the Bretton Woods agreements, in par-
ticular the one that established the IMF, where under article I.2, it states
the aim of the IMF as follows: “To facilitate the expansion and balanced
growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion
and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the
development of the productive resources of all members as primary objec-
tives of economic policy.” The key background publication for these ideas
was the League of Nations publication from 1944 titled International
Currency Experience: Lessons of the Inter-war Period and mainly written by
12Nurkse. (See further Urban in this volume) This does not only show the
breadth of Nurkse’s influence, but also shows why his and his generation’s
development ideas are so relevant today: the strategy proposed by classi-
cal development economists is, first, based on a historically proven recipe
of targeting increasing returns activities and, second, doing so under more
or less financially stable conditions. It also shows, however, that following
the path of balanced growth makes it clear that there is a need for global
balancing rules as well. While the post-WWII era showed that this can
indeed be done, the year 2008 has taught that such global financial rules
are direly needed again.
Krugman (1994) argues that the decline of high development theory has
methodological reasons: “so why didn’t high development theory get
expressed in formal models? Almost certainly for one basic reason: high
development theory rested critically on the assumption of economies of
scale, but nobody knew how to put these scale economies into formal
models.” Krugman admits that in particular Hirschman and Myrdal were
consciously against increasing modeling in economics. His own argument
that modeling is inevitable in economics is based on two simplifying
assumptions: first, science is based on models and second, models need to
be mathematical. While both assumptions are, to say the least, debatable
(see in particular Drechsler 2004 for an excellent discussion), putting the
blame on the doorstep of high development theory, Krugman along with
much of the economics profession completely misses the other side of the
story: how model-based economics interpreted post-World-War-II develop-
ment stories. As we will argue below, because the model-based economics
assumed away increasing returns and technology from development, it was
left with tools Nurkse and others deemed counter-productive when used
without targeting precisely the increasing returns activities: trade openness
and foreign financing as the main engines of growth. As the saying goes,
if all you have is a hammer, pretty soon all problems look like nails. This is
precisely what happened. While high development theory argued for a con-
text-specific approach and tailor-made policies – because economic activi-
ties, technology, knowledge and economies of scale change enormously in
time and space – the new development consensus on the rise in the 1980s
and in full sway to this day argues the opposite: all developed problems are
fundamentally alike, and thus, solving them should go by more or less the
same policy prescriptions. The success of such an approach lies in the very
nature of development: as Hirschman argues, all development presupposes
some form of priority setting through policy making. (Hirschman 1958) The
Washington Consensus did away exactly with this assumption: since all
development problems are assumed to be of the same nature, the solutions
are bound to be the same as well, and this takes the burden of proof, so to
say, away from domestic policy-making. 
1314
3. Washington Follies
It has been more or less thirty years since the alleged death of classical
development economics. The ‘demise’ was precipitated by the onslaught of
“The Age of Milton Friedman”
10 and by what about fifteen years ago
became more widely known as the Washington Consensus.
11 It can be
argued that it was truly an intellectual “counter-revolution”, a term used
both by the supporters and the critics (see Johnson 1971 and Klein 2007
respectively). The counter-revolution, whatever its ideological core or its
public enemies may have originally been (be it development economics
proper, Keynesianism or Bastard Keynesianism),
12 was in its core aimed at
juxtaposing two seemingly different development traditions: East Asia’s rise
and Latin America’s doom in the 1970s and 1980s. However, this was only
possible by showing, first, that East Asia’s rise was based on using policies
based on classical Ricardian comparative advantage thinking and using
exports as an ‘engine of growth’ (see from Balassa 1971 to Rodrik 2006
and World Bank 2008a), and second, that Latin America’s problems had its
roots in failed or at least mismanaged import substitution industrialization,
closely related with the classical development economics (see from
Bhagwati 1984 to Rodrik 2007). 
In both cases, the counter-revolutionaries or their descendants got it wrong:
exports were only a part of the success story in East Asia’s rapid rise, and
import substitution played only a relatively insignificant part in Latin
America’s fall. 
East Asia’s story was told in a way as if feedback linkages and positive
externalities emerging in these economies through state-led industrialization
played only an exogenous role in development.
13 That is, technology and
innovation were simply left out of the story, and a rather simplistic conclu-
sion was drawn: export-led growth is what works in development coun-
tries. Latin America’s problems, in turn, were seen through a double prism
of inflation and rent-seeking, without, however, realizing that increasing for-
eign private lending in the 1970s also spurred the consumption engine into
higher gear, which was bound to lead to the current account problems
(through import consumption) and eventually towards long-lasting financial
fragility that undermined industrialization efforts, and not the other way
around. (Kregel 2008) That is, the role of the post-Bretton Woods interna-
10 Schleifer 2008; see Galbraith 2008 from the opposite perspective.
11  Classic reference is Williamson 2002 summarizing “what Washington means by policy
reform”, originally published in 1990; see also Williamson 2008.
12 For accounts from rather different perspectives, see Toye 1987 and Klein 2007.
13 Wade 2004 is an excellent overview.tional financial architecture was ignored and, in fact, together with the
newly learned ‘lessons’ from East Asia about export-led growth, it was pre-
cisely the accelerating financial liberalization that was seen as the main
source of the much-needed capital for the export-led growth model.
14 Two
plus two equals five: development needs foreign investments and exports,
and both could be provided by a stable macro-economic environment and
liberalized markets. In sum, two misinterpretations ended up providing a
new model for development that evolved into the Washington Consensus
as a full-fledged ideology and set of policies.
Significantly, both misinterpretations marked a break with a long-standing
development tradition reaching back to the Renaissance (see Reinert 2007
in detail) –that was, however, also supported by many if not most neo-clas-
sical economists at the time (excellent summary is Evans and Alizadeh
1984) – namely, that infant industry protection is a necessary if not suffi-
cient condition for industrialization and diversification. Also Williamson’s
original list of Washington Consensus policies included infant industry pro-
tection, and “a moderate general tariff (in the range of 10 percent to 20
percent, with little dispersion) might be accepted as a mechanism to pro-
vide a bias toward diversifying the industrial base without threatening seri-
ous costs”. (2002) Neither made it into the Washington Consensus prac-
tices in the 1990s or into its augmented version of the 2000s.
15
With these misinterpretations, however, not only were real developments
misunderstood, equally important is to note that comparing East Asian and
Latin American development experiences yields key lessons about the suc-
cess and failure of development strategies. More precisely, perhaps the key
lesson is that protectionism does not equal protectionism. If development
history teaches us that infant industry protection is a conditio sine qua non,
then it is exactly the comparison of two very recent instances of this strat-
egy that can teach us the reasons for success and failure. Indeed, based on
these two historical experiences, we can create two ‘ideal types’ of pro-
tectionism. In Table 1, we try to distill from vast and diverse historical data
and different contexts two such ‘ideal types’.
15
14 Blecker 2000 provides an overview of export-led growth strategies.
15 A useful discussion of international agreements and industrial policy space is Rodrik 2007,
129-148. For Augmented Washington Consensus, see Rodrik 2006.Table 1: Ideal types of protectionism compared.
Comparing the two, it is clear that key differences between these ‘ideal
types’ rest precisely in the issues that especially Nurkse, but also other early
development economists, thought fundamental to development. First, the
idea that development needs specific economic activities that exhibit long-
term potential in terms of learning curves, home-market expansion and
exports. Such activities provide dynamic increasing returns that in turn cre-
ate possibilities for continuous upgrading through educational, labor-market
and other policies. This is what East Asian countries did; Latin American
countries failed to target windows of opportunities in different activities and
a need for competitive pressure was underestimated. Second, the failure to
create dynamic economies of scale led to financial fragility relatively easily,
in particular when foreign capital inflows and lending became prevalent ele-
ments in the development strategy, as happened in Latin America in 1980s.
These lessons, however, were almost completely missed by the
Washington Consensus.
16 Moreover, what is historically significant is the
16
16 It is interesting that China’s development strategies over the last few decades exhibit the
results of this skewed learning process in international development mainstream: while in the
1980s, China seemed to be on the path towards the East Asian type of capitalism where a mix
of competitive markets and technology targeting is a key element, then, reflecting the rise of
the Washington Consensus in the 1990s, China switched to an export-led growth strategy that,
however, also exhibits certain elements from the Latin American type of development: nepo-
tism and static rent-seeking in the policy environment and uneven income distribution. For an
intriguing study of Chinese capitalism, see Huang 2008. fact that the classical development economists were largely made the cul-
prits of Latin America’s problems. It is all the more puzzling when one reads
the original works of these authors and looks at the subsequent history; it
becomes clear, as we have shown above, that it is their theories that pre-
dicted both East Asia’s rise (understanding the key role of technology and
diversity) and Latin America’s doom (understanding financial fragility built
into foreign-financing-led growth strategies). Interestingly, Williamson’s arti-
cle on the Washington Consensus ends with doubt and a premonition along
similar lines of thought: 
A striking fact about the list of policies on which Washington does have a col-
lective view is that they all stem from classical mainstream economic theory,
at least if one is allowed to count Keynes as a classic by now. None of the 
ideas spawned by the development literature—such as the big push, balanced
or unbalanced growth, surplus labor, or even the two-gap model—plays any
essential role in motivating the Washington consensus … This raises the ques-
tion as to whether Washington is correct in its implicit dismissal of the deve-
lop ment literature as a diversion from the harsh realities of the dismal science.
Or is the Washington consensus, or my interpretation of it, missing something?
As we have seen above in Figures 1-3, Washington Consensus policies not
only failed to deliver growth and development to most developing countries,
following such policies seems to have been almost a blueprint for falling
back rather than catching up. Such an enormous, and as we have shown
above, historically unprecedented negative impact goes back to two key
misunderstandings: first, the role of technology and increasing returns, and
second, the role of institutions. However, before we discuss these, it is piv-
otal to understand that what made the 1990s particularly ‘crazy’ in terms
of development was the coincidence of implementing Washington
Consensus policies and the change in techno-economic paradigm. We argue
below that this made export-led growth underlying Washington Consensus
policies a race to the bottom or beggar-thy-neighbor environment because
trade and technology were essentially decoupled both in theory and in poli-
cies.
Carlota Perez, the inventor of the concept of techno-economic paradigms,
has briefly summarized the idea of techno-economic paradigms as follows:
There has been a technological revolution every 40 to 60 years, beginning with
the Industrial Revolution in England at the end of the 18th Century; each has
generated a great surge of development, diffusing unevenly across the world
from an initial core country. … The great wealth creating potential provided by
each of them stems from the combination of the new technologies, industries 
and infrastructures with a set of generic technologies and organisational prin-
ciples capable of modernising the rest of the economy. The resulting best prac-
tice frontier is superior to the previous one and becomes the new common 
sense for efficiency – a new techno-economic paradigm – that defines the 
17guidelines for innovation and competitiveness. … The propagation is highly 
uneven in coverage and timing, by sectors and by regions, in each country and
across the world. (Perez 2006; see also Perez 2002)
The paradigms describe how the technological change and innovation of a
given period are most likely to take place: organizational forms and finance
that are conducive to innovations, what technological capabilities and skills
are needed, and so forth. Accordingly, the new ICT-based techno-econom-
ic paradigm, coming to full force in 1990s, has engendered key changes in
production processes in almost all industries (including many services and
agriculture): outsourcing and the resulting geographical dispersion of pro-
duction functions. These changes have enabled very fast growth in foreign
capital inflows into developing countries as well as industrialization (e.g., in
terms of growth rates of manufactured and high-tech exports). However, in
many cases the outsourcing activities do not exhibit the same dynamics
that used to be associated with them in the originating countries – fast and
sustained productivity growth, raising real wages, forward and backward
linkages – but rather the opposite. (See for detailed discussion and data,
e.g., Palma 2005; Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi 2005; Tiits et al 2008) Thus, the
key assumption of comparative advantage trade models and theories fell
away: even if high technology exports have been growing in developing
countries, this does not mean that we deal with similarly dynamic sectors
with significant increasing returns. (See also Krugman 2008) In result,
increasing global trade easily increases production and investment but not
necessarily global wealth, and, consequently, the allocation of production
across the countries may well be globally inefficient. (Palley 2006, 10) Due
to the changing techno-economic paradigm, integrating developing coun-
tries into the world economy has become an increasingly asymmetrical
affair in many ways.
Coupled with the change of techno-economic paradigm, Washington
Consensus policies emphasising FDI- and export-led growth have created a
truly toxic situation for many developing countries, especially in Latin
America and Eastern Europe, where liability destruction was strong and
quick initially but was then followed by slow asset creation. 
In sum, the Washington Consensus has left many developing countries with
an almost completely changed economic and industrial structure that is
deeply different from and much less skill- and technology-intensive than the
previous structure. This explains the fast growth but also why they do not
catch up with the Asian economies in terms of productivity and income
growth witnessed in Figures 1 and 2 above. 
18As we have mentioned above, there are two reasons why the Washington
Consensus and its descendants run into problems on the level of theory and
in particular on the level of practical advice, and are constantly criticized by
Schumpeterian/evolutionary/institutional economists:
17 the specific, narrow
and eventually misleading understanding of technology and institutions. It
is difficult to argue that neither is significant for growth and development,
and thus, hardly any economist these days argues against the importance
of technology or institutions. Indeed, there is a growing trend to pay rather
extensive lip service to both. The latest fashion in development seems to
be precisely the mix of ‘getting the institutions right’ and ‘getting the tech-
nology right’. Jeffrey Sachs and the World Bank (as proxies for the reign-
ing consensus) advocate that, first, institutional and not simply policy
reforms are key to long-term growth, and second, development strategies
should be based on technology as one of the key drivers of long-term
growth. While both ideas seem very close to what long-term
Schumpeterian critics of the Washington Consensus have advocated, in
reality there is hardly any change in development advice, and the inclusion
of both technology and institutions follows a deeply faulty logic. 
While Sachs argues that “the very science and technology that underpin
prosperity in the rich world are potentially available to the rest of world as
well” (2008, 205), the World Bank wonders “[w]hy is it that existing
proven technologies are frequently not adopted by people who presumably
would benefit most from these technologies” (2008b, 3; see also World
Bank 2008a, 18) This is not far from the neo-classical assumption that
technology is exogenous to growth since technological development is seen
here largely as a linear step-by-step development towards complexity and
as essentially open for various competitors to step up and join the ride. This
is simply not true. In business terms, this equals arguing that since there is
a huge market for computer operating systems, one of the best businesses
in town should compete with Microsoft’s Windows. That this strategy can
be, if at all, taken up perhaps only by Google shows how ridiculous the
assumption is that technology is freely available to all.
Seeing technology as yet another neutral ingredient that can be added at
will into the development blender gravely misunderstands the process of
creative destruction that characterizes capitalist growth. And while the
recent publications by the World Bank do actually refer to creative destruc-
tion (see, e.g., World Bank 2008a, 26, 44-45), it is usually done in an
extremely narrow sense to mean entry of new firms and dissolution of old
ones. Technological development is anything but linear and technology is
19
17 Excellent and authoritative summary is Cimoli et al 2006. anything but freely available. Path dependencies, linkages, spill-overs, exter-
nalities, winner-takes-all markets and highly imperfect and dynamic compe-
tition make technology an unpredictable, high-risk and possibly high-return
endeavor that drives on a tautological logic: technological development
feeds on technological development. (See, e.g., Arthur 1994, Perez 2002)
Even more importantly, technology is a man-made comparative advantage
that creates havoc in the Ricardian comparative advantage model. What
technological development shows is that that the key is not trade as such
but what kind of trade and with whom. (See Gomory and Baumol 2004,
and Palley 2006 for a brilliant discussion) Indeed, trade models without
technology and increasing returns advocate a policy environment that is
bound to lead to beggar-thy-neighbor policies either through exchange rate
depreciations, technological know-how restrictions or the Latin American
type of protectionism described above. Palley describes this logic in the fol-
lowing terms:
First, countries do not benefit from autarky (self-sufficiency) because they lose 
the benefit of economies of scale. Second, countries still want to retain a more 
than proportionate share of industry, as this objective restricts global output 
and drives up prices of goods. Since the countries also export these goods, this
objective confers a terms-of-trade benefit that increases income. (Palley 
2006, 13)
Models and policies that do not assume increasing returns essentially
decouple trade and technology. As we have shown above, successful
development from the last 500 years teaches us exactly the opposite: suc-
cessful trade policy is largely a technology policy. 
As far as institutional change is concerned, it has been argued that most
developing countries did not reform enough or failed to implement properly
Washington ideas: “meant well, tried little, failed much” (Krueger 2004).
The consensus ideas about institutional reform are based on one simple
assumption: institutions are “the rules and norms constraining human
behavior” (World Bank 2006, 5). The author most often associated with
this line of argument is Douglass North and yet somewhat surprisingly one
of the harshest criticisms of the World Bank blend of institutionalism and
policy reform comes precisely from him (just substitute, for simplicity’s
sake, open access societies with developed countries and natural states
with poor societies):
The economists’ natural prescription is to suggest that a country ‘reform’; that
they systematically adopt policies that mimic those in open access order: less
regulatory control, absence of monopolies, more secure property rights,
improved public goods provision such as education and more markets. Such an
approach ignores the fact that natural states adopt limited access policies not
just to maximize the incomes of the ruling elite, but because limited access poli-
20cies address the problem of violence by giving individuals and groups with
access to violence an incentive to cooperate. Policies from open access orders
– universal, impersonal rights and rule of law – reduce the natural state’s abil-
ity to control violence. These changes threaten to make people worse off, not 
better off. … The transfer of institutions from open access orders to natural
states cannot, in and of itself, produce political and economic development. 
(North, Wallis and Weingast 2008, 15) 
North et al. indeed point to a key problem inherent in many of the
Washington Consensus ideas about institutions, namely that an institution-
al setting can be transformed from one society to the next. Such a univer-
sal claim makes it possible to reverse the development logic: in any given
country, one does not start with problems but rather with solutions.
Perhaps the best example is the recent work by the World Bank that advo-
cates openness and context-specific solutions to development problems –
but only as long as the diagnosis and solutions are based on the market fail-
ure approach. (World Bank 2006; World Bank 2008a) This is of course a
mirror image of the Washington Consensus approach: the latter operates
with predefined solutions, the ‘new’ approach with predefined problems.
The Washington Consensus is far from over, it just comes in many new dis-
guises.
Even if it is possible to argue that by now the Washington Consensus has
turned into Washington Confusion (Rodrik 2006), there is scant if any evi-
dence that policy advice given to developing countries or analytical work
done by the Washington institutions has in substance changed at all (Rodrik
also admits this). What is more, there is a growing tendency to deal with
symptoms such as mosquito nets, debt relief and the like. It is obviously
nonsensical to argue that such activities should not be undertaken. It is
however equally clear that such palliative pop star economics, chiefly advo-
cated by Jeffrey Sachs (2005 and 2008) and embodied in UN’s Millennium
Development Goals, will do almost nothing to put poor countries on a sus-
tainable development track. Quite the opposite, it can also be argued that
such treatment of symptoms entraps poor countries into Malthusian boom-
bust cycles of population growth and hunger. As Clark argues, “the sub-
sistence wage, at which population growth would cease, is many times
lower in the modern world than in the preindustrial period. … Given the con-
tinued heavy dependence of many sub-Saharan African countries on farm-
ing, and a fixed supply of agricultural land, health care improvements are
not an unmitigated blessing, but exact a cost in terms of lower material
incomes.” (2007, 45)
Thus, while the former Washington Consensus writers readily admit for a
greater role of technology and institutions in development, their assump-
tions and conclusions seem to lead right back to the Washington Consensus
21mode of understanding the development issues. An interesting example is
Rodrik’s work and, by default it seems, also most recent thinking in the
World Bank. Rodrik’s suggestions for industrial policies in the 21
st century
are hardly if at all compatible with his self-proclaimed neo-classical
approach and with his “growth diagnostics”. While the latter two are obvi-
ously based on the concept of market failure (or government failure that
causes market failure, the result is the same, namely market failure), most
of his policy principles and incentives could have been written by an
Schumpeterian economist. Rodrik’s policy advice ranges from “incentives
to ‘new’ activities”, through a “built-in sunset clause” to demanding that
“activities that are subsidized must have the clear potential of providing
spillovers and demonstration effects” and to subsidizing R&D and “general
technical training” (2007, 114-119). Such policies do not necessitate mar-
ket failure as a concept to understand the need for them; market failure and
the neo-classical approach, however, makes the application of these ideas
context-blind. Clearly, if one assumes a key role for technology in econom-
ic growth, one has to give up market failure as a concept as technological-
ly driven growth is by definition imperfect. Entrepreneurs seek technologi-
cal innovation in order to create market failures. As most economists,
Rodrik, too, thinks that the answer lies in better governance to avoid such
pitfalls. And, as many before, Rodrik is fundamentally governance-blind and
does not realize that the same Washington whirlwind of change has swept
through policy advice on governance as well (on Rodrik’s ideas on gover-
nance, see Rodrik 2008).
Indeed, what looked like a set of hardcore economic policies – neutral to
politics or morals for that better, and thus free of rent-seeking, a proper
there-is-no-alternative or TINA (see already Hirschman 1984) – was in fact
accompanied by a similar sea change in policy making. Rolling the state
back was accompanied by hollowing the state out. This meant that not only
did the policy space became strictly defined, also the way policies were
implemented was radically redefined. New public management or NPM was
as fast and furious in its onslaught as the Washington Consensus. 
While there is a relatively long tradition of making a caricature out of
Weberian or classical bureaucracy that emphasises rule of law, clear hier-
archies, merits and competence (Lynn 2001 for a good overview), what
came to be the meeting point for economic policy and governance reforms
is the loss of increasing returns or technology from their framework of
thinking. While Krugman (1994) and others have documented how main-
stream economics lost scale economies due to increasing modeling in the
aftermath of the WWII, it is interesting that one branch of economics that
seemingly retained scale economies, interpreted them in an highly specific
way. 
2223
From the beginning of their theoretical endeavors, public choice theorists
have concentrated upon a specific kind of scale economies, namely those
limited by regulation and/or monopolistic markets. Indeed, one can follow
this specific way of understanding increasing returns from Stigler 1951 to
Buchanan and Yoon 2008. Public choice theorists go explicitly back to
Smith’s theorem about the division of labor being limited by the extent of
the market and argue that Smith’s accomplishment is in the “replacement
of the mercantilist world of monopolies and cartels by competitive mar-
kets”. (Buchanan and Yoon 2008, 187) It is quite clear that public choice
theorists look almost solely at what can be called internal scale economies.
In fact, this line of argument (looking only at internal scale economies) can
be traced back to Viner’s discussion of trade theory in the 1930s (Viner
1937), who is similarly worried about the potentially monopolistic impact of
internal increasing returns.
18 (See also Reinert 1980, 117-121) In this line
of argument the increasing returns might engender monopoly rents and sti-
fle competition, consequently policy focus should not be on creating activ-
ities with such returns, or not foremost, but on alleviating the market-limit-
ing impact of such monopoly rents. This, in essence, forms the foundation
for the market failure approach discussed above. The entire enormous
impact of external and historical increasing returns is left out of the argu-
ment, and this has had grave consequences for the way public choice and
mainstream economists in general understand the role of the state in eco-
nomic growth. Since competitive environment is seen as the guarantee for
extending market size (and, along the way, lowering prices for consumers)
and increasing division of labor, the government’s main task is to ensure
and maintain such an environment. However, in particular public choice the-
ory takes it much further than that. Namely, according to this theory, the
best way to ensure that government actually looks after the competitive
environment is to inject market discipline also into government activities.
Thus, the government should outsource and privatize as many activities as
possible, there should be markets for public services wherever possible,
there should be internal markets within government, public servants should
be paid according to their performance and so forth. 
What came to be known in the 1990s as new public management
19 thus
has its origins in interpreting increasing returns in a very specific way. The
results, however, have been as disastrous for developing as for developed
countries. As one commentator puts it, “as more and more state functions
18 Somewhat ironically, it was Viner who called Nurkse to Princeton faculty just before the lat-
ter’s death (Nurkse accepted the call, but never started to work in Princeton, however this is
the reason his archive is in Princeton). See Viner’s letter to Nurkse from December 22, 1958,
in Viner’s archive in Princeton, II Correspondence, 1. General correspondence, NI-NY.
19 An excellent summary on the rise and fall of New Public Management is Drechsler 2005;
see also Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004.are sub-contracted to the private sector, so the state begins to lose com-
petence to do things which once it managed very well. … Government
becomes a kind of institutional idiot.” (Crouch 2004, 41) Ironically, the
results of NPM reforms are almost the exact opposite of what public choice
theorists intended: instead of lowering socially costly rent-seeking, “the
more that the state withdraws from providing for the lives of ordinary peo-
ple, making them apathetic about politics, the more easily can corporate
interests use it more or less unobserved as their private milch-cow.”
(Crouch 2004, 19) At the same time, there is strong evidence to suggest
that developing countries profit from classical Weberian bureaucratic struc-
tures, in particular in terms of creating long-term administrative capacity as
Weberian administration relies on strict legal principles (government actions
are regulated by public law), and there is a strong emphasis on merit, com-
petence and achievement in public service (entrance and promotion based
on merit, competences and achievement) and clear hierarchies that enhance
accountability.
20 Weberian bureaucracy tends to focus on long-term strate-
gic goals and thus provides especially developing countries with direly need-
ed stability in policy planning and design. Indeed, the previous lack of strate-
gic capacities in policy-making is perhaps the strongest reason why many
developing countries should be particularly careful in experimenting with
most recent administrative reform fashions like ‘governing by networks’.
(See also Schick 1998) However, we see also in developed European coun-
tries a growing trend towards what has been termed Neo-Weberian State,
where notions of legality and accountability, competence and merit re-enter
both the academic discourse and actual changes in public sector reforms.
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Drechsler 2005).
It is, however, ironic but also deeply significant that in its core, the
Washington Consensus and NPM go back to the same misreading of Adam
Smith. We use here the term ‘misreading’ in a rather specific way. This
term was coined in the late 1960s by Harold Bloom and denotes a process
where authors creatively appropriate phrases, ideas from other authors in
the writing process and mold them into something new or at any rate some-
thing different. Bloom, writing about theory of poetry, writes “Poetic histo-
ry … is … indistinguishable from poetic influence, since strong poets make
that history by misreading one another, so as to clear imaginative space for
themselves.” (Bloom 1997, 5) A misreading does not thus connote a neg-
ative meaning. Generalizing it into a hermeneutical principle, we can argue
that a misreading is the way most theoretical works are read and written.
We argue that the history of economic thought has one such key passage,
namely the Smith’s above-mentioned theorem about the size of the market
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20 See in particular Evans and Rauch 1999, Rauch and Evans 2000, also Wade 2004.and the division of labor. The importance of the theorem can be easily
understood from the famous example Smith himself uses, namely that of
“the trade of the pin-maker”. According to Smith, this particular occupation
has gone through a transformation from a one-man business into at least
18 distinct operations performed by different individuals causing productiv-
ity per employee to increase from one pin a day to 4,800 pins a day. (Smith
1776/1976, 1.1.3) Such productivity explosions that follow innovations
depend, as Smith rightly argued, on extensive trade and, as Smith also
admitted, rapid technological development. While most researchers in eco-
nomics and in related fields agree with the wide-brush description given by
Smith, there are strongly varying misreadings about what causes and stim-
ulates such innovations in the private sector. There are essentially two
opposing schools of thought: On the one hand, there are scholars in the
Schumpeterian/evolutionary/institutionalist tradition who argue that innova-
tions and economic growth in general take place because of knowledge and
skill agglomeration and continuous upgrading and technological change that
are engendered by highly embedded policy-making of increasing coordina-
tion, dialogue and cooperation managed by highly capable state and admin-
istration.
21 On the other hand, there are scholars in neo-classical and pub-
lic choice traditions who argue that the main driver behind innovations and
growth are trade and competition: the former using the comparative advan-
tage of nations to bring more, better and cheaper goods to consumers
(higher efficiency); the latter creating pressures for companies to inces-
santly innovate and outcompete the competitors, and to push prices down-
wards in the process (higher efficiency, again).
22 While the differences in
details are of course greater than described here, it is important to see that
both traditions can be traced back to Adam Smith’s theorem that the divi-
sion of labor is limited by the size of the market (1776). The difference is
how one understands the theorem: the former school takes it to mean that
the division of labor is key (creation of knowledge and technological diver-
sity, and the producer with his capabilities are the main policy goals), the
latter school thinks the size of the market is key (the extent of trade and
competition, and lower prices for consumers are the main policy goals). 
If one, instead of accepting Adam Smith as an icon of free trade and lais-
sez-faire under any circumstances, reads what he says about economic
development at an early stage, one will find that he is very much in line with
classical development economics, where industrialization is the key recom-
mendation. In his early work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith
25
21 See on the role of the state and institutions in economic growth, e.g., Evans and Rauch
1999, Wade 2004 and Amsden 1989.
22 The most recent summary of such arguments is Rodrik 2007. For public choice, see most
recently Buchanan and Yoon 2008 1759/1810), Adam Smith argued passionately for “the great system of
government”, which is helped by adding new manufactures. Interestingly,
Smith argued that new manufactures are to be promoted, neither to help
suppliers nor to help consumers, but in order to improve this “great system
of government”.
In fact, it is possible to argue that Adam Smith was also a misunderstood
mercantilist, someone who firmly supported the mercantilist policies of the
past, but then argued that they were no longer necessary for England. He
praises the Navigation Acts protecting English manufacturing and shipping
against Holland, arguing “they are as wise … as if they had all been dictat-
ed by the most deliberate wisdom” and holding them to be “perhaps, the
wisest of all the commercial regulations of England” (Smith 1776/1976: I,
486-487). All in all, Smith described a development that had become suc-
cessfully self-sustained, a kind of snowballing effect, originating in the wise
protectionist measures of the past. Only once did Smith use the term ‘invis-
ible hand’ in the Wealth of Nations: when it sustained the key import sub-
stitution goal of mercantilist policies, when the consumer preferred domes-
tic industry to foreign industry (Smith 1776/1976: 477). This is when ‘the
market’ had taken over the role previously played by protective measures,
and national manufacturing no longer needed such protection. If one cared
to look, Adam Smith also argued for tariff protection at an early stage as a
mandatory passage point to development as did Friedrich List. Studying
economic policy without discussing the context is one of the destructive
vices of economic practice.
The key is not which side one chooses, however, but to see that both
approaches are not simply complementary to each other but rather should
be seen as following each other in a step-by-step development. This,
indeed, is perhaps the greatest legacy of early development economists and
Ragnar Nurkse: having synthesized these two broad theoretical schools into
a coherent theoretical framework that proved highly successful once
applied in real life.
4. Conclusion: Where do we go from here?
While the Fall of 2008 marks the end of the neo-liberal consensus about
globalization and its rules in many ways, it is very much open to debate
what direction economic and policy thinking will take from here on. Judging
by history, a new development consensus will be in the making for the next
decade. Following the classical development economists, what should be
the cornerstones of the new consensus? 
26As a reminder: we have argued above that the main development challenge
left behind by the Washington Consensus and it affiliates is the difficulty in
creating middle-income economies because of the loss of an activity-spe-
cific approach and of increasing returns-based economic policy making, and
loss of how to generate the administrative capacity for development. In
addition, the current techno-economic paradigm and financial globalization
have enabled the decoupling of knowledge and production, and of produc-
tion and finance. This has led to an international trade environment where
developing countries are in effect engaged in beggar-thy-neighbor types of
policies in order to capture increasing returns activities – and in which many
of them do not succeed and end up in financially fragile development posi-
tions.
The key questions for further research and policy advice can be phrased as
follows: how to couple trade, competition and similar policies with target-
ing increasing returns activities and how to create the financial environment
where such activities (and their change) remain in hedged financing posi-
tions. 
Here we can only demark three key areas where both theoretical and poli-
cy advances are necessary to start understanding how to achieve these
goals; we argue these are areas where there is relatively little research cur-
rently done:
First, the geographical dimension has to be brought back into development
economics as well as policy initiatives. While much of the world trade is in
fact regional, there are few if any effective regional regulatory and policy-
making regimes. Regional policy agenda is pivotal for trade and technology
to exchange rate policies. (See also Wade 2008)
Second, in particular trade and competition policies (but also other areas,
for instance, procurement) should concentrate on targeting increasing
returns activities. There is, however, little research on how this can be done
in a development context.
Third, the creation of the administrative capacity to implement policy
reforms and in particular the capacity for targeting activities should be the
focus of context-specific institutional reforms. While there is growing
research on how highly developed countries recover from NPM reforms,
there is very little research on developing countries.
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